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This paper uses a survey of 300 North Korean refugees to examine the experience of women in 
North Korea’s fitful economic transition. Like other socialist states, North Korea has maintained 
a de jure commitment to women’s rights. However, we find that women have been 
disproportionately shed from state-affiliated employment and thrust into a market environment 
characterized by weak institutions and corruption. As a result, the state and its affiliated 
institutions are increasingly populated by males, and the market, particularly in its retail aspects, 
is dominated by women. Among the most recent cohort of refugees to leave North Korea, more 
than one-third of male respondents indicate that criminality and corruption is the best way to 
make money, and 95 percent of female traders report paying bribes to avoid the penal system. In 
short, the increasingly male-dominated state preys on the increasingly female-dominated market. 
These results paint a picture of a vulnerable group that has been disadvantaged in North Korea’s 
transition. Energies are directed toward survival, mass civil disobedience is reactive, and as a 
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Socialists, going back to Marx and particularly Engels, have grappled with the “woman 
question” in both theory and practice. Socialist states typically enshrined gender equality in law 
at an earlier stage than their capitalist counterparts, though socialist emancipation often created a 
“double burden” as women were called on to enter the workforce while simultaneously bearing 
the traditional burden of homemaker. In certain respects North Korea followed this pattern, albeit 
with some distinctively North Korean twists.  
However, the North Korean economy is now undergoing a second transition: from a 
planned state-socialist system to a hybrid system in which the state has grudgingly acquiesced to 
a larger role for the market. This second transition has a strong gender dimension. Women have 
been shed from the state-owned enterprise sector in greater numbers than men and have 
gravitated to market-oriented employ.  
In other settings, this new-found freedom might be empowering, liberating women both 
from the surveillance of the workplace and traditional patriarchal relationships rooted in the 
household. However in contrast to other developing countries, where the informal sector is 
allowed to play a central role in both urban and rural employ, the North Korean regime has taken 
an ambivalent if not actively hostile posture toward the market, and thus toward the women who 
populate it.   
Documenting changes in North Korea’s notoriously closed economy presents formidable 
challenges, but researchers have begun to exploit the opportunity provided by refugees (cf. Chon 
et al. 2007; Lee 2007; Lankov and Kim 2008; Kim and Song 2008; Lee et al. 2008; Chang, 
Haggard and Noland 2009a,b; Kim 2010, Haggard and Noland 2010a; 2011a). This paper 
explores the gender dimensions of North Korea’s transition by considering the results from a 
2008 survey of 300 North Korean refugees living in South Korea.  
The paper begins with a brief historical overview of the role of women in the North 
Korean political economy, with an emphasis on the dramatic shifts that occurred as the state 
socialist system broke down during the famine of the mid-1990s and the country experienced 
“marketization from below.”  
We then turn to an examination of the sample, household economics and the implications 
of the fact that North Korean women have been disproportionately involved in marketization that 
the state has sought to limit, control and even criminalize. Women are not differentially prone to 
arrest and do not appear to receive distinctly worse treatment than men. But their higher levels of   2
market participation make them more susceptible to confrontations with officials and 
entanglement with the penal system. We argue that high levels of discretion with respect to arrest 
and detention together with high levels of brutality facilitate predatory corruption. Among the 
most recent cohort of refugees to leave North Korea, more than one-third of male respondents 
indicate that criminality and corruption is the best way to make money, and 95 percent of female 
traders report paying bribes to avoid entanglement with the penal system. In short, the 
increasingly male-dominated state preys on the increasingly female-dominated market.  
Our survey shows that women are cognizant of growing levels of inequality and 
corruption. However, we do not find that women hold distinctly dissident views or are uniquely 
willing to communicate them to their peers. Taken together, these results paint a picture of a 
vulnerable group that has been disadvantaged in North Korea’s transition. Women’s energies are 
directed toward survival. Despite periodic reports of spontaneous protest, market women appear 
to lack the tools or social capital to act collectively to improve their status. 
 
Women in the North Korean Political Economy: From Plan to Unplanned Marketization 
 
In 1945, even before the 1948 founding of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North 
Korea), local authorities abolished the traditional hierarchical patrilineal household registration 
system. The following year the Gender Equality Law was enacted, prescribing equal rights to 
women in the areas of inheritance, marriage, divorce, child custody and support claims. The law 
also banned polygamy, concubinage, and prostitution. The 1946 Statute on the Labor of Manual 
and Clerical Workers guaranteed equal pay for equal work (Shin 2001, Jung and Dalton 2006). 
In 1958, Cabinet Decision 84, established targets to increase women’s participation in education 
and various professions. To support both reproduction and women’s participation in the labor 
force, some traditional women’s work was socialized through the establishment of nurseries, 
kindergartens, laundries and other household services (Ryang 2000, Shin 2001). The 1972 
Constitution guaranteed equality, and subsequent legislation such as the Socialist Labor Law 
(1978), and the Infant Education Law (1976) elucidated legal guarantees with respect to 
maternity and childbirth. 
   3
Nevertheless, as in other socialist states, women continued to face a double (or triple) 
burden. In a speech to the Fifth Congress of the Korean Workers Party, founding leader Kim Il-
sung declared that women would be “liberated” from heavy household chores via technological 
change: gas or oil instead of coal cooking, access to appliances such as refrigerators and rice 
cookers, and greater provision of processed foods. These goals were subsequently enshrined in 
the 1972 Constitution as well (Ryang 2000, Shin 2001).  
Needless to say, reality did not live up to the rhetoric. As Park (2011 160) observes, “In 
the authoritarian culture so prevalent in North Korea, the concept of equality was alien to both 
men and women.” Women continued to be channeled into relatively low status and pay 
occupations. As the economy began to falter in the mid-1980s, the resources devoted to the 
nurseries and other institutions designed to ease the “double burden” on women were cut. 
Married women increasingly dropped out of the labor force, and the role of housewife became 
the norm in some locales (Jung and Dalton 2006). The so-called August 3
rd (1984) movement 
created new work units (August 3
rd units) sought to mobilize marginal participants in the labor 
force, including young mothers, to use waste materials for the local production of consumer 
goods. But as the economy deteriorated through the 1990s, the lofty aspirations with respect to 
gender equality became increasingly illusory, and the 1998 Constitution even dropped the clause 
from the 1972 Constitution stipulating that the state “shall liberate women from the heavy family 
chores” (Park 2011). 
Ryang (2000) argues that the early efforts to enshrine equality were made by the People’s 
Committee under the auspices of the USSR with limited local buy-in by North Korean officials 
or participation of North Korean women themselves. Instead, as Jung and Dalton (2006) argue, 
the cult of personality around Kim Il-sung (often described as the benevolent “Fatherly Leader”) 
had strong patriarchal elements, recasting the whole nation in line with traditional or even 
Confucian family structures. The revolutionized female ideal became that of mother. In 
traditional Marxist terms, the “woman question” was transformed into the “mother” or “mother-
worker” question with little attention to other dimensions of gender. For example, while North 
Korea has all sorts of laws on reproduction, there is no legislation on sexual violence and 
harassment (Jung and Dalton 2006).     
Such was the status of women when North Korea entered its particularly problematic 
“transition” beginning in the mid-1990s. Prior to that time, North Korea maintained a classic   4
centrally-planned economy, notable only for the rigor with which markets were suppressed and 
autarchy from the world economy was pursued. Over the past two decades, the importance of the 
market has grown, but not due to pro-active reform. Rather marketization emerged as the product 
of state failure, and particularly the famine in the 1990s that killed perhaps 3 to 5 percent of the 
population. The state’s inability to fulfill its economic obligations unleashed an unplanned, 
bottom-up marketization of the economy resulting in the alteration of social and political 
relations among the populace.  
Rather than leading a transition, policy has been ambivalent, sometimes acquiescing to 
facts on the ground, at other times attempting to reverse them. In July 2002, the government 
initiated a major policy reform with four components: microeconomic policy changes, including 
alteration of administered prices and wages; macroeconomic policy changes, including the 
introduction of direct taxes; the establishment of special economic zones; and aid-seeking.
1  
Since roughly 2004-05, the policy trend has been one of “reform in reverse.” The government 
introduced new controls on both domestic markets and cross-border exchange, and pursued a 
failed attempt to resuscitate the state-run quantity rationing system for food. A botched 
November 2009 currency reform epitomized this trend, destroying an unknown share of 
household savings and adversely affecting market traders in particular. 
One side effect of the famine, economic mismanagement, and political repression has 
been an ongoing exodus of refugees, primarily into China from whence more than 20,000 have 
eventually found asylum in South Korea. The gender dimension of the refugee problem is now 
thoroughly documented (Human Rights Watch 2002; Amnesty International 2004; Muico 2005; 
K. Lee 2006; Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 2009; National Human Rights 
Commission of Korea 2010). Almost 80 percent of the North Koreans currently entering South 
Korea are female, a figure that has nearly doubled over the past decade.  
                                                 
1 North Korean enterprises were instructed that they were responsible for covering their own 
costs despite mandated wage increases for favored groups and continued efforts to maintain an 
administered price structure that badly lagged the inflation in market prices. In the absence of 
any formal bankruptcy or other “exit” mechanism, there was no prescribed method for 
enterprises squeezed between these conflicting imperatives to cease operations. One response 
was for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to engage in entrepreneurial activity, either by 
establishing “funding” and “foreign exchange earning” squads within the SOE or by effectively 
outsourcing entrepreneurship and adjustment via August 3
rd units.   5
There is evidence that men and women have had differing experiences in transit. In 
China, male refugees are often employed in heavy labor such as mining, construction, and 
forestry, and may possibly be more involved in “round-tripping”: voluntarily returning to North 
Korea bearing food or money, then returning to China. As we found in our sample, women 
refugees reaching South Korea spend longer in transit than men, in part because they are more 
likely to be the victims of human trafficking, sex work, and brokered marriages with rural 
Chinese husbands.
2 Not surprisingly, a survey of North Korean refugees in China found that 
women were more likely than men to experience fear and anxiety about their vulnerabilities in 
China (Chang, Haggard, and Noland 2009a). 
However, the differential experience of men and women was not limited to the refugees; 
the failed transition of the mid-1990s within North Korea also had a strong gender dimension. 
During the famine, women as well as men took responsibility for securing food for their families, 
both by generating income and in navigating the cash transactions and barter through which 
staples and other foodstuffs were secured (Lankov and Kim 2008). As the state socialist system 
frayed, households appear to have decided that it was important to retain the male heads of 
households in state employ. This allowed households to meet security requirements and access 
residual social services provided through the work unit--however inadequate--while women were 
free to exploit opportunities outside the state sector (“opportunity entrepreneurship”) or lost their 
jobs as state-owned enterprises downsized (“necessity entrepreneurship”). 
As a matter of policy, women have been disproportionately shed from employment in 
SOEs. Working for the state is considered more politically advanced “man’s work,” though in 
some cases women have been provided some assistance in the form of start-up capital or licenses 
in the emerging market-oriented retail sector. Since 2004-05, the state has banned men from 
working in the markets, and in 2007 prohibited younger women from working there, ironically 
giving older women a leg up in at least the retail aspect of North Korea’s marketization.
3 As a 
                                                 
2 The unions are not officially recognized, and indeed are giving rise to a population of children 
who are effectively stateless, regardless of the constitutional niceties of China and North Korea 
(Robinson 2010). In its annual reports on human trafficking the United States State Department 
regularly classifies North Korea in the worst category, Tier 3 (US State Department 2011). 
3 It has been argued that the as the relative economic position of men has declined, spousal abuse 
has increased, providing a distinct incentive for women to emigrate (Park 2011).   6
consequence, women have been prominent in the few documented instances of mass civil 
disobedience such as the March 2008 protests in Chongjin when authorities sought to limit 




To explore the role of women in this marketization process, we draw on a survey of 300 North 
Korean refugees living in South Korea conducted in November 2008. (Methodological detail is 
contained in Appendix A.) Such surveys are susceptible to two sorts of bias, an intrinsic one 
involving self-selection, and a second, extrinsic one involving unweighted samples. With regard 
to the first, those who undertake the risks of trying to leave North Korea probably have some 
otherwise unobserved individual characteristics that differentiate them from the rest of the 
population; these may include more adverse life experiences and more severely truncated 
opportunities, both of which could give rise to both behaviors and attitudes that are quite 
different from the population as a whole. The survey presented below may thus accurately 
capture the views of the refugee community in South Korea, but may not accurately reflect the 
experiences of the current North Korean population.  
A second, more tractable issue is that the population of refugees may not be 
demographically representative of the resident, non-refugee population, over-representing 
particular segments of the population such as women or particular occupational categories. We 
know, for example, that women make up roughly half the population of North Korea but account 
for a much larger share of the refugee community in South Korea (and of the sample). This 
problem can in principle be addressed ex post using multivariate techniques, as is done below by 
combining estimated coefficients with national level demographic information to construct 
counterfactual estimates for the North Korean population as a whole.    
The sample mirrors what is known about the refugee community resident in South Korea. 
The overwhelming majority of the sample is prime age adults, with just over half between the 
ages of 35 and 50. A significant majority are women (63 percent), reflecting a growing gender   7
gap among the refugees who manage to reach South Korea as well.
4 Residents of the northeast 
provinces are overrepresented, as has been the case with previous surveys conducted in both 
China and South Korea. Most respondents were from two northeast provinces: North Hamgyong 
province (50 percent), followed by South Hamgyong province (14.7 percent). This distribution 
of responses actually makes these provinces somewhat less overrepresented than in earlier 
surveys, but these provinces do nonetheless account for only about 23.1 percent of the North 
Korean population (United Nations Population Fund 2009).
5  
  North Korea’s mandatory education includes a year of kindergarten, four years of 
primary school and a six-year middle school; at that point (age 15-16), students come to the end 
of mandatory education or are channeled into technical school (2-3 years), college (4 years) or 
university (4-6 years), and from the latter on to postgraduate studies. Women in our sample 
exhibit slightly lower levels of educational attainment than men, with unmarried women 
reporting somewhat less schooling that married women (table 1). Multivariate statistical analysis, 
not reported in the interests of brevity, indicates that this difference in education is not 
attributable to marriage per se. Rather it appears to be connected to the relatively young age of 
the unmarried female refugees at time of departure, and possibly to their disproportionately rural 
backgrounds. 
  The occupational status of the respondents is complicated somewhat by the presence of 
52 self-identified housewives in the sample (table 2). If we look only at those in the 
economically active population—excluding housewives, students and retirees (73 respondents, 
or just under one quarter of the sample)—the largest category among those in the workforce was 
laborers (40 percent), followed by government (17 percent), and then merchants, farmers, 
farmers, professionals, soldiers and teachers, each with accounting for between 5 and 8 percent 
of the sample.  
                                                 
4 It should be noted that the refugee community in South Korea may not be representative of all 
those who have left North Korea.  For example, an earlier survey, conducted in China, found that 
men and women were represented in roughly equal numbers (Chang, Haggard, and Noland 
2009a, b). 
5 There are two main reasons for the overrepresentation of the northeast provinces: these rustbelt 
areas were by consensus the worst affected by the famine, and their geographical proximity to 
China makes egress easier relative to other parts of North Korea.    8
Almost two-thirds of the housewives are from rural areas, meaning that they are living on 
state farms or cooperatives, and urban and rural housewives may have distinct experiences. We 
doubt seriously whether self-identification as a housewife on the part of rural respondents 
implies release from agricultural labor, while urban housewives may include a disproportionate 
number shed from SOE employment and thrust into “necessity entrepreneurship.”  
Looking at the occupational distribution by gender, not surprisingly, males are 
overrepresented in the military and government/party, females in teaching.   Interestingly, 6 
percent of respondents listed their occupation as “merchant,” and nearly two-thirds of those were 
women, roughly in line with women’s total sample share. Again, the treatment of self-identified 
housewives is problematic; if they are excluded from the sample of the economically active, then 
the propensity for a woman to be a merchant would be noticeably higher than that for a man.  
Unmarried females appear occupationally distinct: they are disproportionately laborers, 
perhaps consistent with their lower levels of educational attainment. It is not surprising that this 
group has been a target of trafficking. 
  A final set of demographic variables of importance are the date when respondents left 
North Korea, how much time they spent abroad before coming to South Korea, and how much 
time they have spent in South Korea. The date of exit is crucial in methodological terms, because 
it determines the relevant time frame for all of our retrospective questions, which ask about 
conditions at the time they left North Korea. 
With respect to time of departure, we have an adequate number of respondents to divide 
the sample in multiple ways. For some purposes it is useful to consider what we will call the pre- 
and post-reform subsamples, with those leaving in 2003 and after as the post-reform group.  
These two groups are almost exactly equal in size. For other questions the pre-reform group is 
divided into two:  a “famine era” group (those leaving in 1998 or before, roughly 25 percent of 
the sample); and a “post-famine” group (1999-2002, again 25 percent). Similarly, we can divide 
the post-reform group into a “reform” era group (those leaving between 2003-2005, 35 percent 
of the sample) and a “retrenchment” group (2006 and after, 15 percent). However, when the 
sample is disaggregated by gender (table 3), it is evident that unmarried women exited the 
country disproportionately early: two-thirds left during the “pre-reform” period, only one-third 
leaving during the “post-reform” era. In terms for the four era periodization, 40 percent of the   9
unmarried women left in the earliest, “famine era,” period, and only 5 percent during the most 
recent “retrenchment” era.   
How then does one square the notion that females tended to leave North Korea relatively 
early, but account for a rising share of recent arrivals in South Korea? As shown in figure 1, men 
and women, especially unmarried women, exhibit different patterns with respect to duration in 
transit between North and South Korea. For men, the median length of time in third countries 
before arriving in South Korea is two years.  For unmarried women it is five years.
6  There is 
little difference across the subsamples in time residing in South Korea when interviewed; in all 
cases the median period was four years. Time spent outside North Korea could potentially be 
important both in terms of memory bias and socialization to new views of North Korea because 
of time spent in China and particularly South Korea. However neither variable was statistically 
significant in any of the subsequent statistical analysis reported below.  
  
Women in the Household Economy 
 
Historically money and prices played little role in North Korea’s planned economy. Urban 
residents received monthly rations for household goods distributed at nominal prices; workers on 
agricultural cooperatives and state farms retained annual in-kind allotments of food, and received 
a basket of consumer goods in return for agricultural output sold to the state at a derisory 
procurement price.   
  The most common work unit classification among the respondents was state-owned 
enterprise, both for the respondents themselves (23 percent) and for spouses (31 percent). In 
addition, a significant share of respondents (10 percent of the sample) worked for the August 3
rd 
detail of an SOE, units set up in the 1980s to engage in local production of necessities. State 
farms or cooperatives accounted for 14 percent of respondents and 10 percent of spouses, 
although as we have seen this underestimates the share of rural population in the survey.  
                                                 
6 One can only speculate as to the reasons. Unmarried people may have been less risk averse in 
terms of the migration decision and better able to adapt once in China. This could contribute to a 
phenomenon that emerges from some interviews. Some young women made the decision to 
migrate to China, but once settled in China and exposed to more information, made a second 
decision to on-migrate to South Korea.   10
Government and party offices accounted for 9 percent and 2 percent, respectively; the army was 
also represented among the refugees. 
  Engagement in private activities, particularly trading, is ubiquitous but is nonetheless 
gendered (table 4).
7 Women report more involvement in trading than men (76 percent v. 63 
percent), and male respondents report more trading by their female spouses than vice versa (68 
percent v. 55 percent) These magnitudes are consistent with those obtained in an earlier survey 
cited in Kim and Song (2008) and Lee et al. (2008). Female participation in “other business 
activities”—probably including provision of services--is slightly higher than male participation.  
However, more males report participation in August 3
rd units (23 percent v. 10 percent). 
Women also report higher participation rates for their spouses in August 3
rd units than men 
reported about their spouses.  This result—higher participation in August 3
rd units by men—is 
notable because a prerequisite for participation in August 3
rd units is employment in the state 
sector, typically an SOE. Taken together the results in table 4 are consistent with a situation in 
which men held positions in SOEs and August 3
rd units and female labor was disproportionately 
shed from state employment and entered the market. 
Estimates of the propensity to engage in market activities is reported in table 5.  Ceteris 
paribus, both married women and housewives are almost 50 percent more likely than men to 
engage in market activities, (regressions 5.1, 5.2). When the group of housewives is 
disaggregated into rural and urban components, it is clearly the urban housewives that are 
generating the result (specification 5.3). This is precisely the group most likely to have been shed 
from employment in state-affiliated institutions and thrust into “necessity entrepreneurship.”  
There is evidence that market participation surged during the reform period, but did not 
significantly contract during the subsequent period of retrenchment. 
It is possible that the raw results on sources of market participation may reflect the 
overweighting of some demographic groups relative to the underlying population. In principle it 
                                                 
7 The question asked was whether “in addition to your regular work, did you ever engage in the 
following activities,” allowing them to list all that apply: private trading; providing private 
services (hairdresser, bicycle repair); other private business activity; and August 3rd unit. The 
inclusion of August 3rd unit was designed to catch respondents formally working for an SOE 
and listing it as the primary work unit, but in fact working in an August 3rd unit. However, we 
cannot rule out the possibility of double-counting since the questionnaire includes August 3rd 
units in the main question concerning work unit.   11
is possible to combine the coefficients reported in table 5 with national level demographic data 
(sources described in appendix B) to derive projected values, conditional on the fact that these 
models have been estimated from a sample of refugees whose experiences may not mirror those 
of the society as a whole. The sample and projected national means, along with their 95 percent 
confidence intervals, are displayed in figure 2. There is a noticeable difference between the 
sample values and the projected nationwide results indicating that our sample over-represents the 
most marketized demographic groups. This outcome is not surprising given the large share of 
women in the sample. For all three specifications the results fall just within the 95 percent 
confidence limits. 
  The respondents were asked what share of household income came from private business 
activities at the time the individual left North Korea, a more accurate indicator of dependence on 
the market than simple engagement in a given activity. The results are staggering. The modal 
response, nearly half the sample, reported that all of their income came from private business 
activities at the time they left North Korea (table 6). More than two-thirds of the respondents—
69 percent—reported that half or more of their income came from such activities. Only a handful 
of respondents—4 percent—reported that none of their income came from the market. Moreover, 
there appears to be little difference between respondents that left in the famine, post-famine, 
reform, and retrenchment periods; dependence on market income is high in all periods, although 
by the reform and retrenchment periods virtually every household received at least some income 
from the market.
8  
There is a modest tendency for women to report greater reliance on the market for 
income than men. For example, 49 percent of women (versus 41 percent for men) reported 
getting all their income from the market. More than half of married women (51 percent) 
indicated that they were getting all their income from market activities.  However, what is 
striking about the extent of engagement in the market is its uniformity across the sample, and 
along multiple dimensions; as a result gender differences are not statistically significant.  
                                                 
8 The apparent lack of trend is consistent with an earlier survey done largely on refugees who 
had left North Korea before either the 2002 reform or the 2005 retrenchment (Kim and Song 
2008, Lee et al. 2008).   12
Yet a third way of getting at the extent of marketization is to move from employment and 
income to expenditure, and particularly for food. In principle, urban residents, about two-thirds 
of the population, were fed via the state-run quantity rationing system, the public distribution 
system (PDS). Yet fully 28 percent of urban residents in the sample indicated that they never 
received food through this channel.  Among those who indicated that they had received food 
from the PDS, it had ceased to be the primary source of food for more than 20 percent of this 
group by 1993. Within two years, less than half of respondents were obtaining food primarily 
through the PDS.
9  Instead, the market and self-production became the primary means of 
accessing food (table 7).
10  
The data on reliance on the market for food reveals obvious gender-related aspects as 
well. The shift from state-distribution to the market is particularly evident for females. From 
1999 through the end of the sample period, not a single female respondent reports that the PDS 
was her principal source of food. Access to the PDS was tied to employment in state-connected 
entities, and this effective denial of access to the state-run rationing system is consistent with 
shedding of female labor as a matter of policy.  Again, unmarried women appear distinct; they 
are much more reliant on their own efforts, either purchasing food in the market, or growing it 
themselves, and appear to have had noticeably less access to state support, either through the 
workplace or the PDS. 
Ordered probits were estimated on the ordinal responses displayed in table 7 and simple 
probits on those respondents reporting that all their food was obtained though the market (table 
8). The list of correlates which are not robustly correlated with marketization of consumption is 
long. Neither age, year or “era” of departure from North Korea, time in South Korea or third 
countries, educational attainment, geographical markers, nor political classification matters in 
this regard. The failure of any of the “era” variables to be significantly correlated with the share 
                                                 
9 These results hold for the full sample, the post-famine subsample, and the post-reform 
subsample, demonstrating that they are not simply an artifact of sample truncation or censoring 
associated with early leavers providing relatively early-dated responses to the question.  
10 The fact that so many reported growing their own food is particularly revealing given the low 
share of farmers in the sample, suggesting that resort to self-reliance was pursued even by non-
agricultural households.   13
of food obtained in the market (controlling for demographic characteristics) is significant, since 
it undercuts the weak evidence that might be adduced from figure 3 that the state had 
reconstituted the PDS in the post-retrenchment period. Rather, the regressions underscore the 
consistency of involvement in the market and the apparent absence of a time trend.  
Gender is the only robust correlate with marketization of consumption: women reported 
purchasing a higher share of their consumption in the market and were more likely to get all their 
food in the market. This result may reflect that women were more likely to be shed from SOEs 
than men, losing access to workplace food rations and preferential PDS rations provided some 
SOE workers. They were thus forced to rely on the market.  
However, the estimates could also be misleading due to an artifact of the household 
division of labor. If women were responsible for shopping, their answers may more accurately 
reflect real household consumption patterns than the answers provided by men. If so, the 
significance of the gender variable could reflect the fact that men, lacking first-hand knowledge, 
provide downwardly biased estimates of how much household food was being obtained through 
the market. In any event, the centrality of the market on the consumption side mirrors the high 
degree of involvement of the market with respect to income. 
Counterfactual projections on the national population were once again generated (figure 
3). Differences between the sample and the counterfactual projections are slight and easily within 
the 95 percent confidence interval in all six cases.     
Because household reliance on the market was so ubiquitous, gender differences with 
respect to reliance on the market for income were dampened to some extent. Nonetheless, we do 
see substantial differences in the propensity to engage in market activities. Data on consumption, 
in particular, at least suggests a gendered household division of labor in which men have held on 
to SOE employment while women operate in the market.  
 
The Criminalization of Economic Activity 
 
Given that the women appear to occupy a growing role in market activity, it is important to 
understand how the state treats this activity. The answer is that the regime is highly ambivalent 
about it, oscillating between grudging tolerance during periods of severe shortage and harsh 
crackdowns during periods when it seeks to reconstitute the state sector. In addition to the well-  14
known political prison camps,
11 the regime has criminalized a range of market activities and 
established an extensive system of low-level labor training facilities (ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae) to 
incarcerate people involved in unauthorized movement to access food, black market activity, 
border-crossing and the other economic crimes (Noland 2000). The 2004 reform of the criminal 
code and subsequent amendments regularized these facilities and specified “labor training” for 
up to two years as punishment for a growing number of economic and social crimes (Han 2006).  
Incarceration in the two types of lower-level facilities—the labor training facilities (ro-
dong-dan-ryeon-dae) and the collection centers (jip-kyul-so)—was by far the most common form 
of contact with the penal system among our respondents. Of the 102 survey respondents who 
reported some incarceration, 49 reported spending time in a labor-training center and 68, or 23 
percent of the entire 300-person sample, reported being detained in collection centers.   
There is some evidence that the state may have been forced to acknowledge the central 
role that market activity plays in sustaining households and it has thus acted in ways which serve 
to re-enforce the gendered household division of labor we appear to see in the data. Arrest rates 
are correlated with participation in market activity: statistical analysis of detention experiences 
suggests that those involved in market activities are roughly half again as likely to be 
incarcerated (table 9).  However, we do not find that gender per se increases the propensity to be 
incarcerated and in terms of raw sample numbers, men are more likely to have been incarcerated 
than women (43 percent v. 30 percent). When arrested, men are more likely to have come into 
contact with the political as distinct from the regular police (79 percent of male respondents v. 63 
percent of female respondents), and perhaps as a consequence, they are more likely to have been 
detained in harder core institutions (i.e. larger shares in prisons and collection centers, and fewer 
in labor training facilities).  
While participation in the market is associated with a greater propensity to be arrested, 
this tendency is not observed among women who indicated that they were participating in market 
activities, but derived less than half of their income from the market (table 9). This reduced 
                                                 
11 The hierarchy of penal institutions includes the notorious kwan-li-so, variously translated as 
political prison camps, labor colonies, or concentration camps. In addition, the state operates the 
kyo-hwa-so—literally, a “place to make someone better through education” and jip-kyul-so or 
“collection centers,” institutions that roughly correspond to felony prisons and misdemeanor 
jails, respectively.   15
likelihood of being arrested among those somewhat less engaged in market activities may simply 
reflect a reduced likelihood of getting caught. But it could conceivably reflect a stance on the 
part of the government that sees male participation in the market as more threatening than female 
participation and that shows some forbearance where market activities are small scale or part 
time and seen as serving primarily survival purposes. However, when the share of income 
derived from the market rises to more than half, this protective effect—whatever its source—
disappears and women are arrested at the same rate as men.  
Once arrested, detainees receive little formal due process; of the 102 respondents in the 
2008 survey who had been incarcerated, only 13 reported even receiving a trial at all. There is 
little variation in this pattern by gender; men and women are denied trials at similar rates.  
Abuse is ubiquitous throughout the system: In both the lower-level criminal facilities (the 
collection centers and the labor training centers), nearly half of respondents report seeing 
executions, roughly three-quarters report forced starvation, and nearly a third report witnessing 
deaths from beatings and torture. These levels of violence are witnessed despite the generally 
shorter periods of incarceration in these lower-level facilities.
12 The pattern of responses is quite 
similar to that obtained in an earlier survey conducted in China (Chang, Haggard, Noland 
2009a): a high response rate with respect to generalized forms of abuse, a much lower response 
rate on the highly specific question on infanticide, lending that respondents are not simply 
providing interviewers with information that they would like to hear. 
Reported rates of witnessing such abuses is high for both genders, though women 
consistently report witnessing abuse at lower rates than men. Again, this may possibly reflect 
some forbearance with respect to market activity, for example through incarceration of women in 
facilities that are de facto if not de jure sex-segregated, either by residence of work activity (table 
10).  However, we have evidence from other sources that sexual abuse in North Korean prison 
facilities appears to be rampant, most commonly abuse of female prisoners by guards. 
                                                 
12 The mean period of incarceration in both types of facility was in the range of one month to one 
year. Prisoners experiencing this typical length of incarceration in a collection center witnessed 
abuses at the following rates: executions (75 percent), forced starvation (100 percent), and death 
by torture and beatings (50 percent). For the labor training centers incarceration for the typical 
period of time was associated with observing abuses at slightly lower rates: execution (60 
percent), forced starvation (90 percent), and death by torture or beating (20 percent).   16
Unauthorized sexual relations are prohibited, and women who become pregnant while 
incarcerated are subject to severe punishment (Harden 2011). In addition, the North Korean 
regime has taken a particularly dim view of marriages between North Korean women and 
Chinese men. Repatriated women who are suspected of becoming pregnant in China have been 
subject to forced abortions, and infanticide has been practiced (Hawk 2003). The legal code 
changes also specify relaxed treatment for pregnant women, though in practice these protocols 
are breached, and in some cases forced abortions continue to be practiced (Lee 2006; Sheridan 
2006). It is not surprising that other research has found that incarceration of North Korean 
refugees is highly correlated with psychological distress akin to post-traumatic stress disorder, 
with women being particularly vulnerable (Chang, Haggard, and Noland 2009a). 
Changing Pathways of Advancement 
 
Despite the fact that authorities have been constrained to allow women to operate in the market, 
and may even show some forbearance, the criminalization of economic activity seems almost 
designed to promote extortion by state officials. Figure 4 reports responses to three questions 
about the business environment from female respondents who engaged in private business or 
market activities, grouped by time of departure. In each case, respondents were asked to rate 
their opinion or belief on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 indicates strong disagreement and 5 indicates 
strong agreement. The combined “totally agree” and “agree” shares are shown.  
In all periods, a majority of the women agree with the statement that “I was unable to 
trade in legal markets,” although this share declines over time. Majorities also agree with the 
statements that “the government frequently changes the rules governing market activities,” and 
“I had to pay bribes to engage in private activity.” Perhaps not surprisingly the patterns of 
response to questions about capricious policy and bribery run parallel and could be interpreted as 
reflecting the vicissitudes of North Korean policy. During the reform period the affirmative 
response rates fall, but then rise again when the state reverses reform and retrenches, with fully 
95 percent of the women reporting a necessity to pay bribes in the most recent period.
13 
                                                 
13 The high reported response to changing market rules parallels a similar result obtained in a 
survey of 300 Chinese firms doing business in North Korea, where 79 percent of the respondents   17
The survey respondents were also asked a series of questions designed to get at changing 
perceptions of the most effective pathway to both increased status and income. When asked the 
best way to get ahead in North Korea, officialdom (including both government and party) 
trumped both the military and engaging in business, with more than 70 percent of the 
respondents citing it in all sample periods. But “engaging in business” more than doubled from 8 
percent among respondents departing in the famine era to 18 percent for those leaving in the 
post-reform periods.
14  
  A more striking set of social changes is apparent from a question asking “what is the 
easiest way to make money in North Korea: work hard at assigned job, engage in market 
activities, engage in corrupt or criminal activities, or none of the above” (table 11). Although 
securing a government or party position is highly desirable there is no sense that merit is 
rewarded; in the post-reform period, only a single (female) respondent indicated that working 
hard at your assigned job was the best way to make money. The most frequent response among 
both women and men was that engaging in market was the way to make money.  
But a striking finding is the growing and gender-differentiated share that regarded 
corruption and criminality as the most lucrative career path. More than one-third of male 
respondents (36 percent) in the most recent cohort reported that criminality and corruption are 
the easiest ways to make money as compared to 24 percent of female respondents, possibly 
reflecting their differential opportunity to do so via their disproportional representation in the 
state apparatus.  
  These results shed important light on the responses to the question about the gender 
dynamics of how to get ahead in North Korea. Read in conjunction, the answers to the two 
questions suggest strongly that an official position is not valuable because hard work and merit is 
rewarded, but because it provides a platform for engaging in business or pursuing corrupt or 
                                                                                                                                                             
cited arbitrary changes in rules and regulations as a barrier to doing business in North Korea 
(Haggard and Noland 2011b). 
14 Interestingly, despite the proclamation of “military-first” politics, the army declined as a way 
of getting ahead—while institutionally the military may have experienced rising influence, from 
an individual standpoint, the largely conscript army was not seen as a channel of advancement, 
with not a single respondent in the most recent subsample citing it as the way to get ahead.     18
criminal rent extraction. Indeed, the observation is confirmed directly by the subset of 
respondents employed in government or party offices who reported a rising corruption among 
their colleagues (Haggard and Noland 2010a, table 7). But this process has a gender dimension 
as well. Women have been differentially shed from public employment and thrust into the 
market. A consequence is that the state sector—and the platform for corruption it provides—is 
increasingly male-dominated. In essence an increasingly male-dominated state preys on an 
increasingly female-dominated market. 
 
The Feminization of Dissent? 
 
Given that women operate at the interface between state and market, we would like to know if 
they have distinctive political views or whether they might even come to play a leading role in 
resisting the regime. Not surprisingly, the refugees as a whole hold overwhelming negative 
attitudes toward the incumbent regime. Nearly 87 percent of the respondents disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with the statement that the Kim Jong-il regime was getting better. More than 
90 percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the 
economy was improving, citing rising materialism (92 percent), corruption (87 percent) and 
inequality (84 percent) as problems.  Moreover, the share of respondents holding the government 
responsible for these developments grows across the time-of-departure cohorts; more than 95 
percent among those who left in the post-retrenchment period (i.e., after 2005) held the 
government rather than foreign powers as responsible for these developments. Given how 
negative views are, there is little variation in perceptions by gender; if anything, women tend to 
have slightly less critical attitudes. 
It may not be surprising that both North Korean refugees and citizens harbor adverse 
attitudes about the regime or that these have gotten worse over time. Yet a crucial question for 
the future of the regime is the extent to which such views are communicated and become the 
basis for collective action. It has been argued that the market has become a semi-autonomous 
zone of social communication, and potentially, political organizing (Lee 2009, Everard 2011). 
Women are prominent in the market, and have figured prominently in rare instances of civil 
disobedience that have revolved around pocketbook issues (Martin and Takayama 2008).  Could 
nascent dissent in North Korea have a feminine cast?   19
In table 12, The refugees were again presented the refugees a series of statements about 
their experiences in North Korea and asked that they grade their responses on a 1-5 scale 
(1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree). For these questions, 
however, we posed the questions not about the respondent’s attitudes and behavior but about 
“people” in North Korea. From the standpoint of political anthropology, these questions can be 
interpreted as a kind escalating ladder of dissent, beginning with the extent which people joke, 
followed by complaining, and organizing.  The shares affirming the statement that people make 
jokes about the government or complain never exceeds 45 percent in any of the subsamples. 
Even among an unusually disaffected subgroup of the population—refugees—and despite their 
overwhelmingly negative assessment of the regime, less than half of the sample report that their 
peers joked or complained about the government. There is little systematic variation in the 
responses of men and women to these questions.  
What about collective action? Could participation in market activities serve to overcome 
barriers to collective action? To what extent might the market itself become the locus of overt 
political conflict with the government? Survey responses depict relatively low levels of 
collective action among traders. When asked whether traders cooperated with each other, the 
share of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing ranged from 32 to 42 percent across the four 
time periods with no perceptible trend—and little variation across gender. Likewise, when asked 
whether traders in the market were beginning to organize to protect their interests, the 
affirmative response rate was 28 to 29 percent in all time periods—implicit evidence of the 
continuing atomization of North Korean society.  
This does not mean, however, that citizens are quiescent; disaffection may be channeled 
into private actions that, while not overtly political, may nonetheless have longer-run 
implications for the stability of state socialism; participation in the market is itself one example 
of such activity. Another is the willingness of citizens to access alternative sources of 
information that are likely to conflict with official mythology. It is evident that the informational 
barrier is increasingly permeable: a rising share, a majority in the retrenchment period, report 
watching or listening to foreign media, and critically, a falling share (nil in the era of 
retrenchment) report having access to foreign media but declining to watch or listen (table 13). 
Not only is foreign media becoming more widely available, inhibitions on its consumption are 
declining as well. And it is foreign news media that are being consumed: when the respondents   20
were asked to differentiate between access to and consumption of entertainment and news, the 
share consuming foreign news reports is almost 30 percentage points higher than the share 
consuming foreign entertainment products.  
Access to information matters. Consumption of foreign media was associated with more 
negative assessments of the regime and its intentions (Haggard and Noland 2010b). However, 
there appears to be a gender gap with respect to access: a majority of female respondents in all 
periods report that they did not have access to foreign media, and as a result consumption of 
foreign media by women was much lower than men. Again, this may be at least in part due to 
personal experience: exposure to the penal system and the political police is statistically 
correlated with consumption of foreign media and news (Haggard and Noland 2010b), and men 
exhibit both higher propensities of arrest and contact with the political police than do women. 
 
Conclusion   
 
Like other socialist states, North Korea has maintained a de jure commitment to women’s rights, 
though actual practices have fallen far short of the rhetoric.  Importantly, these commitments 
appear to have been imposed from above supported by little if any political activity at the 
grassroots. This lack of grassroots activity in support of women’s issues may help explain the 
discriminatory policies undertaken by the North Korea government during its problematic 
transition.  Women have been disproportionately shed from state-affiliated employment and 
thrust into a market environment characterized by weak institutions and corruption. The upshot is 
that the state and its affiliated institutions are increasingly populated by males, and the market, 
particularly in its retail aspects, is dominated by women. 
Those involved in market activities have a greater likelihood of arrest and this pattern 
brings large numbers of North Korean women into contact with the predatory officials and the 
penal system.  Women do not appear to be differentially targeted; to the contrary, the evidence 
suggests that the state may have acted to re-enforce this gendered division of labor by showing 
some forbearance toward women while behaving more harshly toward men engaged in 
presumably similar activities. Men come into contact with the political police at higher rates than 
women and are channeled into harsher institutions; women exhibit a greater propensity to end up 
in the lowest level institutions that confine economic criminals. Yet conditions in these lower-  21
level penal facilities approximate in measurable ways conditions in facilities designed to house 
felons and even the most dangerous political prisoners. Moreover, we have evidence from other 
sources that the treatment of women in these facilities includes sexual abuse.  
Because the political views of the respondents are so uniformly negative, political 
attitudes exhibit little significant variation across genders.  In certain respects women are 
marginally less critical of the government while in other dimensions they evince greater 
skepticism. Nor, on the whole, do they appear to have a greater propensity to communicate, 
much less act, on their views.  
Taken together, these results paint a picture of a vulnerable group that has been 
disadvantaged in North Korea’s transition. Women have been pushed into North Korea’s 
emerging market economy, where they are vulnerable to predation by a male-dominated state. 
Yet their energies are necessarily directed toward survival. To date, mass civil disobedience has 
been reactive, and as a group, women appear to lack the tools or social capital to act collectively 
to improve their status.   22
Appendix A 
 
The survey was implemented with the cooperation of the Association of Supporters for 
Defecting North Korean Residents (ASDNKR), a quasi-governmental organization established to 
assist incoming North Korean defectors through services such as counseling and introducing the 
newly arrived North Koreans to academic or job opportunities.
15  A pilot survey was conducted 
in August and September 2008 of refugees who visited the ASDNKR for personal business. 
Respondents in both the pilot and subsequent surveys were informed that their participation was 
voluntary, that the identity of respondents would be held confidential, and that the survey was 
part of an academic research project based in the United States. Participants in both the pilot and 
full surveys received modest gift certificates for their participation.  
Following the pilot survey, the ASDNKR facilitated contact with the Sung-ui 
Association, a private civic organization of North Korean defectors with about 7,000 members 
and 16 offices in South Korea, to recruit staff to conduct the full survey. The Sung-ui 
Association introduced seven defectors who agreed to administer the survey in neighborhoods 
with concentrations of North Korean refugees; the staff were compensated for their work.
16  Two 
training sessions were held for the survey administrators to explain the purpose of the research, 
the nature of the survey instrument, and the requirements of the research project. The survey was 
stratified on one dimension with respect to which there was some confidence about the 
underlying population: gender. An effort was made to contact defectors who had recently arrived 
in the South in order to capture changing views over time, but many refugees had left during the 
famine period, while others reached South Korea only after having spent months or years in third 
countries.  
The full survey was administered from October to November 2008.  
First, the survey administrators contacted individuals in their neighborhoods to conduct face-to-
face interviews, yielding about 100 respondents. Second, small groups were recruited to meet for 
a free lunch or dinner in addition to the gift certificate. Third, a final group was contacted 





                                                 
15 Later, subsequent to the completion of the survey, ASDNKR was replaced by the Foundation 
for North Korean Defectors by the 2010 revision of the North Korean defectors law in order to 
improve and expand services for newly arrived North Koreans. 
16 The seven administrators were residents of the Seoul area: two from Nowon-gu, a district in 
northwestern Seoul with a large defector population; two from Gangseo-gu ; two from 
Yangcheon-gu; and one from Songpa-gu. 
17 A total of 313 surveys were administered; 13 were invalid and had to be discarded.    23
Appendix B 
 
Due to lack of a comprehensive and reliable data source for North Korea, the national level 
values used in the computation of the counterfactuals were constructed using various sources and 
techniques. To match our sample, data on population between the ages of 15 and 64 were taken 
from the UN D P R Korea 2008 Population Census National Report. 
For the occupation variables, shares of students and soldiers were calculated from the 
Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS) database. United Nation Economic and Social 
Council Report (2002)’s data on labor force distribution were used to assign shares for 
professionals, government/office workers, farmers, laborers and teachers. The share of merchants 
were based on an estimate of the number of traders (Gey 2004). Share of housewives was 
calculated from the 2008 census using the figure for women indicating that their main activity 
was not employment but rather housework. To calculate work unit values, the army and 
unemployed or retired were assigned the values of soldiers and economically non-active in the 
KOSIS database. The shares for “State Farm or Agricultural Cooperative”, “State Owned 
Enterprise(SOE)” and “Government or Party Office” were distributed in the same proportion as 
estimates of agriculture, industry and the service sector reported in Noland (2000), with SOE 
employment adjusted for August 3
rd workers using Gey’s estimate of traders. The remaining 
workunit share was allotted to “other workunits”.  The categorical and binary dependent 
variables were converted to a 0-100 scale from which the probability weighted mean responses 
were calculated. 
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Elementary 1% 2% 1% 0% 2%
Middle School 56% 63% 61% 78% 59%
College (4yrs or 
above) 25% 18% 21% 13% 20%
Post College 
( G r a d u a t e ) 2 % 1 %1 %0 %1 %
Technical 
School (3yr) 15% 15% 15% 10% 16%
Others 0% 1% 1% 0% 1%






















Professional 6% 6% 6% 8% 7% 4% 9%
Government/Office Work 22% 12% 15% 17% 19% 7% 19%
Farmer 5% 6% 6% 9% 7% 11% 8%
Merchant 7% 6% 6% 9% 8% 4% 10%
Housewife 0% 29% 19% ‐ ‐ ‐‐
Laborer 41% 28% 33% 40% 40% 68% 32%
Teacher 3% 5% 4% 7% 5% 4% 8%
Soldier 11% 1% 5% 2% 6% 0% 2%












Famine Era (~1998) 25% 24% 25% 40% 20%
Post‐famine Period (1999‐2002) 19% 28% 25% 28% 28%
Post‐reform Period (2003‐2005) 38% 34% 36% 28% 36%
Post‐retrenchment Period (2006~) 17% 14% 15% 5% 16%






















Private Trading 63% 68% 76% 55% 65% 67%
Provision of Private Services 11% 9% 8% 11% 15% 6%
Other Private Business Activities 25% 29% 15% 14% 20% 3%















Workunit: state owned enterprise -0.544 -0.512 -0.503
(0.379) (0.372) (0.374)
Workunit: State farm or agricultural cooperative -0.567 -0.553 -0.533
(0.401) (0.394) (0.397)
Workunit: Government or party office -1.002** -0.857** -0.848**
(0.420) (0.413) (0.415)
Workunit: Army -0.826* -0.821* -0.806*
(0.475) (0.465) (0.467)
Workunit: Unemployed or retired -0.762* -0.757* -0.753*
(0.397) (0.391) (0.393)
Workunit: Other -1.136*** -1.078*** -1.071***
(0.374) (0.366) (0.368)
Post-famine Period (1999~2002) 0.345 0.357 0.356
(0.234) (0.233) (0.233)
Reform Period (2003~2005) 0.408* 0.466** 0.474**
(0.212) (0.211) (0.212)
Retrenchment Period (2006~) 0.156 0.223 0.217
(0.257) (0.256) (0.256)
Constant 0.939*** 1.010*** 0.999***
(0.350) (0.342) (0.344)
Observations 300 300 300
Pseudo R-squared 0.0702 0.0604 0.0614
Log likelihood -158.9 -160.5 -160.4
Chi-squared 23.99 20.63 21.00
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5. Probit models predicting private market participation
Binary 1=Private Market 
Participation 0=No











None 4% 4% 4% 3% 5%
less than 10 percent 11% 13% 12% 18% 11%
10‐25 p e r c e n t 6 %9 %8 % 1 3 %9 %
25‐50 percent 12% 4% 7% 3% 4%
50‐75 percent 13% 9% 10% 10% 9%
More than 75 percent 14% 12% 13% 13% 12%














Grew it myself 25% 20% 22% 25% 17%
Public distribution system 11% 11% 11% 19% 7%
Workplace 11% 4% 7% 0% 7%
Bought in the market 32% 24% 27% 31% 20%
Given by friends and family 7% 15% 12% 13% 17%
Barter 11% 15% 14% 6% 20%












Grew it myself 38% 21% 26% 55% 12%
Public distribution system 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Workplace 0% 4% 3% 0% 5%
Bought in the market 29% 49% 43% 36% 52%
Given by friends and family 14% 6% 8% 0% 7%
Barter 10% 19% 16% 0% 24%












Grew it myself 29% 38% 35% 45% 37%
Public distribution system 7% 0% 3% 0% 0%
Workplace 5% 0% 2% 0% 0%
Bought in the market 33% 45% 40% 18% 50%
Given by friends and family 2% 2% 2% 9% 0%
Barter 14% 8% 10% 18% 6%












Grew it myself 26% 35% 31% 100% 29%
Public distribution system 16% 0% 7% 0% 0%
Workplace 21% 4% 11% 0% 4%
Bought in the market 26% 42% 36% 0% 46%
Given by friends and family 0% 4% 2% 0% 13%
Barter 5% 12% 9% 0% 13%












Grew it myself 29% 28% 29% 43% 25%
Public distribution system 8% 3% 5% 8% 1%
Workplace 8% 3% 5% 0% 3%
Bought in the market 31% 41% 37% 28% 44%
Given by friends and family 5% 6% 6% 8% 6%
Barter 11% 13% 12% 8% 15%






(8.1) (8.2)  (8.3)  (8.4)  (8.5) (8.6) 
Female 0.351*** 0.380*** 0.358** 0.460*** 0.508*** 0.443**
(0.134) (0.142) (0.144) (0.164) (0.172) (0.177)
Occupation: Professional ‐ 0.259 ‐0.209 ‐0.816* ‐0.701
(0.377) (0.385) (0.458) (0.474)
Occupation: Government/Office Worker ‐0.346 ‐0.281 ‐0.452 ‐0.239
(0.316) (0.336) (0.362) (0.394)
Occupation: Farmer ‐0.574 ‐0.772* ‐0.155 ‐0.283
(0.388) (0.453) (0.436) (0.514)
Occupation: Merchant ‐0.345 ‐0.390 ‐0.555 ‐0.538
(0.370) (0.380) (0.431) (0.448)
Occupation: Housewife ‐0.123 ‐0.176 ‐0.215 ‐0.263
(0.316) (0.322) (0.353) (0.363)
Occupation: Student ‐0.178 ‐0.302 ‐0.549 ‐0.759*
(0.358) (0.363) (0.418) (0.429)
Occupation: Laborer ‐0.281 ‐0.252 ‐0.328 ‐0.209
(0.293) (0.303) (0.330) (0.346)
Occupation: Teacher ‐0.295 ‐0.360 ‐0.401 ‐0.458
(0.414) (0.432) (0.475) (0.501)
Occupation: Soldier ‐0.232 0.103 ‐0.616 ‐0.253
(0.401) (0.454) (0.494) (0.563)
Workunit: State Owned Enterprise ‐0.202 ‐0.398 ‐0.598** ‐0.602*
(0.215) (0.263) (0.259) (0.314)
Workunit: August 3rd unit of an SOE 0.089 ‐0.067 ‐0.123 ‐0.082
(0.264) (0.305) (0.304) (0.351)
Workunit: State Farm or Agricultural Cooperative ‐0.052 ‐0.203 ‐0.309 ‐0.270
(0.270) (0.334) (0.318) (0.397)
Workunit: Army ‐ 0.223 ‐0.636 ‐0.539 ‐0.590
(0.314) (0.409) (0.395) (0.517)
Workunit: Unemployed or retired ‐0.048 ‐0.268 ‐0.228 ‐0.232
(0.239) (0.278) (0.275) (0.321)
Workunit: Other 0.180 ‐0.025 0.037 0.147
(0.217) (0.269) (0.246) (0.308)
Constant ‐0.309 ‐0.196 ‐0.022
(0.225) (0.322) (0.416)
Number of Observations 300 300 300 300 300 300
P‐value 0.0299 0.176 0.218 0.00106 0.0326 0.0179
Chi‐squared 15.52 13.94 20.05 24.19 19.66 30.01
Log Likelihood ‐463.2 ‐464.0 ‐460.9 ‐191.0 ‐193.2 ‐188.1





























Private Activities 0.405** 0.433** 0.484** 0.493** 0.566***
(0.187) (0.190) (0.194) (0.196) (0.203)
Workunit: August 3rd unit of an SOE 0.469* 0.479* 0.472* 0.462* 0.467*
(0.250) (0.251) (0.251) (0.251) (0.252)
Workunit: Army 0.740** 0.739** 0.730** 0.722** 0.737**
(0.328) (0.324) (0.326) (0.326) (0.332)
Education: Post College  1.097* 1.084* 1.145* 1.140* 1.128*
(0.628) (0.625) (0.644) (0.643) (0.643)
Constant ‐0.748*** ‐0.749*** ‐0.749*** ‐0.748*** ‐0.749***
(0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156)
Observations 300 300 300 300 300
Pseudo R‐squared 0.0438 0.0453 0.0495 0.0495 0.0551
Log likelihood ‐185.1 ‐184.8 ‐184.0 ‐184.0 ‐182.9











Share of Respondents who: Male Female Total
Witnessed Executions 52% 48% 50%
Forced Starvation 74% 68% 71%
Death by torture or beating 33% 22% 27%






Male Female Male Female
Work hard at assigned j o b 4 %3 %0 %1 %
Engage in market activities 69% 77% 62% 69%
Engage in corrupt or criminal activities 20% 14% 36% 24%
None of the a b o v e 6 %6 %2 %5 %
Share who identify the easiest way to 
make money is:













Totally Disagree & Disagree 38% 38% 38% 48% 35%
Neutral 23% 22% 22% 26% 21%
Agree & Totally Agree 39% 37% 38% 22% 40%








Totally Disagree & Disagree 43% 46% 45% 43% 46%
Neutral 18% 17% 17% 17% 16%
Agree & Totally Agree 39% 32% 35% 35% 32%









Totally Disagree & Disagree 88% 92% 91% 96% 92%
Neutral 5% 4% 4% 0% 5%
Agree & Totally Agree 5% 4% 4% 4% 4%








Totally Disagree & Disagree 36% 42% 40% 48% 41%
Neutral 8% 9% 9% 4% 10%
Agree & Totally Agree 6% 7% 7% 4% 7%













46% 20% 30% 6% 27%
I had access to foreign news or entertainment 
programs but did not watch
7% 9% 8% 13% 7%
I did not have access to foreign news or 
entertainment programs
46% 72% 62% 81% 67%







33% 28% 30% 18% 31%
I had access to foreign news or entertainment 
programs but did not watch
14% 2% 5% 9% 0%
I did not have access to foreign news or 
entertainment programs
52% 70% 65% 73% 69%







67% 32% 48% 45% 33%
I had access to foreign news or entertainment 
programs but did not watch
2% 6% 5% 0% 7%
I did not have access to foreign news or 
entertainment programs
31% 58% 48% 55% 59%







68% 42% 53% 0% 46%
I had access to foreign news or entertainment 
programs but did not watch 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
I did not have access to foreign news or 
entertainment programs






















































































































































































(Reg 8.1)  (Reg 8.2)  (Reg 8.3) (Reg 8.4)  (Reg 8.5) (Reg 8.6)
(%)
Figure 3. Share of Family's Consumption of Food Purchased in 
the Market: Sample vs. National Projection  43
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Figure 4. Women's Views on the Business 
Environment
I was unable to trade in legal 
markets. 
The government frequently 
changed the rules governing 
market activities. 
I had to pay bribes to engage in 
private activity. 